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Within the framework of Russia’s national identity politics, the chapter examines the political usage 
and public discussion of migration with regard two cases situated in opposite sides of the change 
that occurred in Russia between 2013 and 2014. First it is examined how the oppositionʼs new front 
man, Aleksei Navalʼnyi, used Muscovitesʼ emphasised anti-immigration moods in his campaign of 
the Moscow mayoral election in 2013. Naval’nyi’s campaign resulted as an extraordinary success 
when against all expectations he became the second in the race and nearly took the election into the 
second round. Navalʼnyiʼs ultimate breakthrough into the federal level politics coincide with the 
year when Russiaʼs anti-immigration moods reached the hitherto peak. Likewise, Navaʼnyiʼs 
success was accompanied with even more worrisome trend from the Kremlinʼs viewpoint; the 
constant decrease of president Putinʼs public support. However, by March 2014 Putinʼs ratings were 
dramatically recovered and avenues for oppositional politics radically curtailed. The second case of 
the chapter focuses on this side of the change by examining prevailing media representations of 
Ukrainian refugees who superseded the role of migrants in the summer 2014 in Russiaʼs public 
discussion. The chapter shows that dominant discourses of migration create a sort of continuum 
regardless of these dramatically changed political conjunctures. They evoke similar visions for 
Russiaʼs ideal state of affairs in which an ethnisised hierarchisation of labour linked to the 
politically contextualized flows of foreigners plays the major role. 
Introduction 
In November 2013 the clear majority of Russians agreed with the statement ‘Russia for ethnic 
Russians’ (Rossiia dlia russkikh). This statement has become one of the major indicators in 
monitoring ethnic relations in Russia. According to the Levada Centre – the main conductor in 
measuring the perception of this statement – the overall number of its sympathisers in 1998 was 43 
% while in late 2013 the number was 66 % (Levada 2013; Levada 2011). In light of these results the 
director of the Levada Centre, Lev Gudkov (2013), pointed out that Russians are not anymore 
ashamed of supporting the statement which has been seen as the central signifier of ethnic 
nationalism in the multiethnic state. In today’s Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet 
ideological tenet of nationless communism and holding the second place in the number of 
immigrants in the world (United Nations 2013), the growing importance and public support to 
ethnic nationalism can be seen as an intersection of ideational compensation for the lack of fixed 
national as well as state identity. Similarly, ethnic nationalism points at the overall dissatisfaction 
with the stateʼs policies regarding the role of ethnically non-Russians (ne russkie). Hence, in late 
2013 that overall support to Russia with ethnic Russians (66 %) was accompanied by the clear 
reluctance of immigrants from Southern Republics (61 %, only 6 % sympathised or respected them) 
and 71 % supported the slogan ‘itʼs enough to feed Caucasusʼ (Khvatit kormitʼ Kavkaz) (Levada 
2013). What is more, in November 2013 the public support of president Putin reached the deepest 
bottom so far; ‘onlyʼ 61 % of Russians announced to trust him (which is alarming in the 
authoritarian presidential system), while, for instance in September 2009, while being prime 
minister, 88 % of Russians trusted him (Levada 2015).           
It has become repetitiously confirmed since March 2014, after the annexation of the Crimea, that 
Putinʼs public support has recovered back to those of 2009; for instance, 88 % of Russians trusted 
Putin in October 2015. (Levada 2015). Regarding this sudden recovery, it prompts to ask how the 
the growing importance of migration in Russiaʼs public life over the last 15 years is intertwined 
with the two sides of Russiaʼs major political backbone; the political legitimacy of Putin before and 
after the revolution in Ukraine. This revolution in early 2014 – followed by Russiaʼs dramatic 
political and military interventions into Ukraine – has been the hitherto most serious political 
conflict in the territory of the former Soviet Union after its collapse. Besides the conflictʼs serious 
international repercussions, the revolution marked a notable change in Russiaʼs domestic politics, in 
the Kremlinʼs political performance in particular. The intensified usage of ethnic identifications 
along with the Kremlin’s venture in Ukraine demonstrates that the realm of ethnic others and ‘oursʼ 
has remained an elementary part of the regime’s domestic legitimation, regardless of significant 
political changes that the year 2014 brought apparent in comparison to 2013 (Goode & Laruelle 
2014). Although it would be an overestimation to argue that migration – as a central realization for 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences between people – would create a clear-cut variable for the 
Kremlinʼs political legitimacy, it plays a vital role in it. In this vein, my aim is examine how the 
issue of incomers (conciously avoiding here the loaded term ‘migrationʼ in Russia) is represented 
with regard to two political conjunctures, one in the latter half of 2013, and another in the summer 
2014.  
For the year 2013 I chose a sample of Aleksei Navalʼnyiʼs views concerning migration during his 
campaign in the Moscow mayoral election, and for the year 2014 I chose a sample of articles 
published in the Russian mainstream media in the summer 2014 concerning Ukrainian refugees. In 
the selection of this group of data I used the Integrum databases.1 My standpoint is that Navalʼnyi as 
a major oppositional challenger of the Kremlin in 2013 is a key facet to the political usage of 
migration while the issue of Ukrainian refugees provides an important baseline to Russiaʼs 
migration discourse in the domestically and internationally changed political circumstances. By 
comparing these two themes my goal is to clarify linkages and associations that migration and 
refugees as Russiaʼs transnational reality generate in Russiaʼ public understanding.  Before moving 
to the closer examination of the selected samples I provide an excursion to the issue of migration 
and of its identity political ramifications in post-Soviet Russia.    
Migration and Nationalisms in Putinʼs Russia  
The major event in the gradual breakthrough of nationalist thoughts in Russiaʼs post-Soviet politics 
was the formation of nationalist opposition against Yeltsinʼs Western oriented reformist policies 
followed by the Kremlinʼs response to this opposition over the course of Yeltsin and Putin eras. The 
constitutional crisis and bloody conflict in October 1993 was the momentum for diverse pro-Soviet 
and nationalist forces which allied against Yeltsin, and since the mid-1990s the cornerstone of the 
Kremlinʼs identity policies has been the so called patriotic centrism (Laruelle 2009: 23). While 
initiated by Yeltsin it was Putin who has greatly benefited from this idea in manipulating it to his 
advantage in eliminating ideological oppositions and encouraging political reconciliation of 
different factions through patriotic rhetoric (ibid.). In terms of nationalism, patriotic centrism 
represents Russiaʼs (and the Soviet Unionʼs) imperial continuum of the state nationalism, or 
politically correct imperial nationalism. The central function of this tenet aims to guarantee the 
peopleʼs unity in the multinational state. As such, reflected for instance in Putinʼs presidential 
campaign writing on Russiaʼs nationalities issues in January 2012, under the pressure of large-scale 
protests of that time – and in particular, under the nationalist segment of the protests – Putin 
emphasised the importance of adhering the Russian cultural norms by ethnic minorities (Putin 
2012). However, by the same token, for Putin the official nationalities policy must follow the 
Soviet-era vision of non-ethnic citizenship which similarly acknowledges the stateʼs multiethnic 
                                                          
1 Integrum is the largest collection of Russian and CIS databases covering a wide range of topics. At the beginning of 
2014 Integrum contained approximately 500 million documents related to Russia. The scope of more than 7000 
databases covers all national and regional newspapers and magazines, statistics, official publications, archives of the 
leading national and international information agencies, full texts of thousands of literary works, dictionaries, and more. 
For more see, http://www.integrumworld.com/about.html. 
composition (ibid.). Following this tenet, the citizenship of ‘sovetskiiʼ (Soviet) has been replaced by 
‘rossiiskiiʼ (citizens of the Russian Federation) in defining ‘the banal nationalismʼ of the official 
state.2 In this regard, the term ‘russkiiʼ as an ethnic category has remained pejorative and 
nationalistic. At the same time, the Soviet legacy of imperial non-ethnicity in Russiaʼs nationalities 
policies has become the major source of dissatisfaction among Russian ethno-nationalists (Pain 
2014). According to them, todayʼs Russia follows the Soviet Union where non-Russian republics 
and autonomies were institutionalized in line with their ethnic stereotypes (for more on this, see 
Hirsch 2005). By contrast, the identification on the basis of ethnicity is not allowed to Russians who 
live in Russia (Pain 2014).  
It is obviously true that the majority of Russians hardly align with this kind of nationalist 
interpretation in explaining the rapid growth of ethno-nationalist sentiments among Russians during 
the last ten years. Indeed, the connotation of the word natsionalizm has generally remained negative 
among the Russians (Dubin 2014), in addition to ethno-nationalists’ relatively marginal role as a 
political movement. However, when nationalism is left aside and shifted from its ideological and 
political realm to the framework of xenophobia, that is, of ethnic and cultural ‘othersʼ, the picture 
becomes different. While in 2005 the overall number of those Russians who sensed ethnic tensions 
in the region they live was 27 %, in 2013 the number was 43 % (Dubin 2014: 8). In a similar vein, 
the number of those who felt negative emotions with regard to comers from Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Southern countries had grown to 61 % (2013) from 43 % (2005) (ibid: 9). Anti-immigrant 
sentiments have become particularly strong in big cities, and in 2013 migration became the most 
acute problem among the Muscovites (55 % shared this view in comparison with 30 % in 2010) 
(ibid:10-11).  
Antipathy towards migrants – almost exclusively perceived as people from Caucasus and Central 
Asia – has become the clearest indicator of ethnic nationalism, and even more importantly, an 
indicator of the change in the Soviet legacy of nationalismʼs overly pejorative associations. 
Russians are increasingly reluctant to share the view of the importance of the Soviet type of multi-
national brotherhood or judging nationalism as a preliminary stage of fascism (see Levada 2013). 
Boris Dubin points out that the main source of the highlighted nationalism in Russia is internal; 
growing dissatisfaction concerning the state of affairs among the ethnic majority which results as 
the ‘ethnificationʼ of societal problems (Dubin 2014:14). Hence, migrants in Russia can be seen as 
victims of Russians’ existing problems rather than seeing them principally as a collective threat to 
                                                          
2 According this  Michael Billig’s classical notion, banal nationalism includes the most common and generally accepted 
forms of nationalism of a state; flags, coat of arms, sporting events, national songs, etc. (Billig 1995). 
domestic security and order (according to this reasoning the latter explanation is predominant for 
Western European countries). In both cases migration can be seen as a central platform for the 
ethno-culturally framed counter-mobilisation. In Russia, however, as Emil Pain (2014: 50) points 
out, the political power (the Kremlin) has hitherto managed to use and manipulate ethnic 
nationalism in preserving the Soviet type imperial nationalism as the official backbone for its own 
political survival and legitimacy. While imperial nationalism precludes particular ethnic chauvinism 
– the governing role of ethnic Russians and the Russian language – larger avenues for the 
organization of ethnic nationalist groups have been restricted; official views and policies have been 
able to satisfy the majority of ethno-nationalist sentiments (ibid.). This seems to be particularly true 
regarding the split among oppositional nationalists since the annexation of Crimea (Iudina & 
Alʼperovich 2014). Many of those nationalists who had viewed the Kremlin critically either 
changed their views since the annexation, or, at least, partially calibrated them with the changed 
situation.3 Moreover, prospects for spontaneous imperial-nationalist movements (for instance, 
around political figures like Aleksander Dugin and Dmitry Rogozin, authorʼs note) in challenging 
the regime have been minimal since their political ideas can be easily absorbed by the Kremlin 
(ibid.; Laruelle 2009). In sum, the dramatic recovery of Putinʼs public support in line with the 
annexation of the Crimea, the Ukrainian crisis and the war in Donbass, is a tangible proof of the 
regimeʼs assimilative capacity. The revolution in Ukraine and its nationalist and anti-Russian 
segments were quickly totalised as manifestations of fascism whose ultimate conqueror is 
Russia/Soviet Union (the narrative of the Great Patriotic War). However, when the operation in the 
Crimea began, followed by fights in Donbass, the Soviet imperial narrative of anti-fascism was 
soon assimilated into the defense of ethnic Russians in the Crimea and in Donbass. For example, 
the term ethnic Russian (russkii) was mentioned approxiamtely 30 times in Putinʼs special ‘Crimea 
speechʼ on March 18, 2014, suggesting that the operation was a defense of our people under hostile 
circumstances (Putin 2014).     
Regarding the developments in Russiaʼs domestic politics since the Ukrainian crisis, the repression 
towards the opposition does not concern the liberal, anti-War wing exclusively but the oppositionʼs 
nationalist wing as well. One of the central actors and organizers of nationalistsʼ annual event, The 
Russian March, Alexander Belov was arrested just before the 2014 march, and in 2015 another 
central figure of the event, Dmitry Demushkin, was prohibited to attend the event (Dergachev & 
Petrov 2015). Whereas the split among the nationalists with regard to Ukrainian event had 
                                                          
3 A good example is Konstantin Krylov, the leader of the National Democratic Party, and a leading theorist of Russiaʼs 
Europe-oriented ethno-nationalist movement (see, for example, Krylov 2014).  
dramatically decreased the number of the marchʼs participants already in 2014, in 2015 the split had 
become deeper, also boosted by administrative means; the previously large-scale march had 
transformed into few pint-sized demonstrations, some of them organized by pro-Kremlin instances 
(ibid; Laine 2015). The Ukrainian crisis seemingly plays the role for the public acceptance of the 
view ‘Russia for Russiansʼ as well. In July 2014 the acceptance of the statement ‘Russia for ethnic 
Russiansʼ dropped to 54 % from 66 % of October 2013 (Levada 2014). However, when measured in 
different terms, there was no actual change concerning the claim ‘the government should restrict the 
flow of incomersʼ. In October 2013, 78 % of Russians supported the claim, in July 2014 the number 
was 76%, while in 2002 the number was 45 % (ibid.). In other words, xenophobic sentiments 
towards incomers over the last 12 years shows an unanimous growing trend. Let us now move to 
the year of 2013, and take a closer look to the yearʼs major political event in Russia.  
Migration in Aleksei Navalʼnyiʼs Political Rhetoric   
Within the large-scale protests in Russia in 2011-2012 the front man and personality of the new 
oppositional and protest movement, its development, expansion and novel techniques became 
Aleksei Naval’nyi, a lawyer and blogger, born in 1976. Indeed, after the regime recovered from the 
December 2011 shock and managed to calm down the protests by establishing Vladimir Putin in his 
third presidential term, it was Naval’nyi who distinguished himself as the most capable threat to the 
Kremlin’s status quo. At the latest this happened during his successful campaign in the Moscow 
mayoral election in August–September 2013, his exclusion from the state-controlled television 
channels notwithstanding. Against all expectations and opinion polls, the second place in the 
election with 27.24% of the votes (Tsentral’naya izbiratel’naya 2013) proved his skills of 
combining highly creative use of the internet with traditional oratory on the streets. In terms of 
Naval’nyi’s political freshness and his overall liberal agenda, his more or less explicit orientation 
towards ethno-civic nationalism has cast an interesting twist. Naval’nyi has been a key figure in 
Russia’s national-democratic movement, which has challenged  the traditional division of post-
Soviet Russian nationalism between imperialists (either Soviet, or anti-Soviet) and ethno-
nationalists (comprising various xenophobic and racist movements) (Laruelle 2014: 277–78; see 
also Moen-Larsen 2014). 
I see two major reasons why Navalʼnyʼs campaign rhetoric in the Moscow mayoral election offers a 
vantage point to the issue of migration in Russia. First, it was the election in which the development 
of Russiaʼs xenophobic sentiments reached the peak, while being also the most concrete proof of 
the Kremlinʼs vulnerability under the open political competition in the uppermost important region, 
Moscow.  Second, Navalʼny was not the initiator of using anti-immigration in the campaign but it 
started the Kremlinʼs candidate, and the ultimate winner, the sitting mayor Sergei Sobianin 
(Verkhovskii 2014). Thus, in terms of polls of the electionʼs results that predicted Sobianinʼs 
landslide victory and Navalʼnyiʼs marginal support – eventually ended in the situation where the 
second round was close between Sobianin (51 % of votes) and Navalʼnyi – it is essential to examine 
the issue of migration in Navalʼnyi campaign rhetoric as a central ideational component in his 
electoral success.   
Besides constant references to highly suspicious statistics concerning crimes conducted by migrants 
(Podrabinek 2013), Navalʼnyiʼs populistic mastery payed also a close attention to personal, ‘our 
common fear,ʼ in the front of migrants. Here is a one quote from his numerous meetings with 
Muscovites – the way Navalʼnyi took to the street separated himself from competing candidates as 
well – cited in the web-journal Bolʼshoi Gorod (Aivazian 2013):  
‘Do you know that 40 % of the young male population of Tadzhikistan lives in 
Russia? And the majority of them in Moscow. Sobianin needs people who can be 
easily despoiled. Raisa Semenova, this question does not worry you only. 80 % of 
Muscovites answer in social polls that the topic of migration worries themʼ, Navalʼnyi 
answers.   
Navalʼnyi easily shifted the focus from the obvious unreliability of his statistical references to 
migration’s emotional repercussions among Muscovites. For instance, in a meeting of voters in the 
Vodnoi stadion metro station, he pointed out that ‘Iʼm not worried about numbers related migration, 
I am worried about every stolen handbag from women in my regionʼ (Navalʼnyi 2013a). When 
viewing recordings of these campaign meetings it is easy to see how Navalʼnyiʼs links migration to 
its ‘mundane realitiesʼ, in particular, to corruption. Following his story during the meeting in the 
Vodnoy stadion, he mentions about pensioner, physically in good shape, who told him that he 
would like to work as a caretaker for the staircase where he lives, and whose official monthly salary 
is approximately 30, 000 rubles. However, this was not possible and a Tadzhik caretaker continues 
working there. According to Navalʼnyi the reason for this is that the official salary of this Tadzhik is 
the same, 30, 000 rubles, but this Tadzhikistanin factually earns 12, 000 because is ready to ‘payʼ 
the remainder, 18, 000, to employing instances – authorities and companies – which provide the job 
(ibid.). While mediating everyday xenophobia via such emotionally resonating narratives, 
Navalʼnyi avoids explicit ethno-nationalist aspects though migration is almost regularly the topic in 
his campaign speeches which evoked applauses in audiences (see, for instance, Navalʼnyi 2013a; 
2013b; 2013c). The best testimony of Navalʼnyiʼs views on migration during the campaign can be 
found in the interview on the Ekho Moskvy radio station conducted by its editor-in-chief Aleksei 
Venediktov which was dedicated to the topic of migration although other issues were also touched 
upon (Navalʼnyi 2013d).  When Venediktov aimed to highlight the economic importance of 
migrants in terms of labour as well as of the part of their salaries for the consumption in Moscow 
after remittances to their native countries,4 Navalʼnyi downplayed this argument by contrasting the 
realm of migrants with practices of a modern city:    
They receive money but, forgive me, they live here, they use metro which is 
subsidised by the city. They donʼt have insurance but they use medical services for 
which we pay. They use education (their kids). They…well, no matter whether we 
want or not want to admit, they conduct pretty many crimes (this statement is 
followed by a dispute with Venediktov, J.L.)…In addition, the most important thing: 
we cannot speak about the value of slave labour in terms of additional value simply 
because we speak about the value of slavery…These people, unfortunately, live as 
slaves. And if they were working according to the guaranteed 8-hour day with paid 
day offs, insurance, if taxes were paid from their salaries, then their salaries and the 
value of work would not differ from any Muscovite or from any other. By calling 
these people here to the position of slaves, dragging and settling them into houses to 
be demolished, into basements, apartments crowded by 30 people, we simply 
encourage those means of production which we had in the 19th century…The principal 
employer for migrants is the city, city instances or private instances which work for 
the city…whatever, we are those employers, we eventually pay these money…We 
must prohibit hiring foreigners within the year in order to stimulate companies to 
improve the productivity of labour.   
 
This part of the interview encapsulates all the central components of Navalʼnyiʼs political usage of 
migration during the campaign as well as pinpoints his liberal ethno-nationalism more generally 
(Laruelle 2014; Moen-Larsen 2014). The main thrust in Navalʼnyiʼs argumentation is to prefer a 
situational logic of ‘common reasoningʼ instead of pursuing ideologically loaded markers, for 
instance, nationalist or democratic (Lassila 2016). In other words, despite revealing his distaste to 
Central Asian and Caucasian migrants and stressing their cultural incompatibility with ‘usʼ, 
Navalʼnyi equates the situation with the corruption. While corruption figures as a nodal point of his 
common reasoning, all ideologically resonating orientations – from racism and nationalism up to 
democracy and humanism – can be absorbed into this nodal point.  Since ‘weʼ want to live in a 
modern, rich megalopolis,5 where ‘weʼ  as common taxpayers are the main driving force, migration 
and its cultural factors as well as the existing inhuman exploitation of slave labour simply hinder 
                                                          
4 As it is known, the major part of GDPs of poor Central Asian States comes from migrantsʼ remittances working in 
Russia, see for example, Michel 2014; Virkkunen & Fryer 2015.  
5 The budget of Moscow – according to Navalʼnyi is 1.6 trillion roubles – proves that in fiscal terms Moscow should be 
one of the wealthiest cities in the world (Programma Navalʼnogo 2013). Navalʼnyi regularly used this aspect in 
openings his campaign meetings (see, for instance, Navalʼnyi 2013a; 2013b; 2014c). 
this development. In this vein, loopholes and controversies of his argumentation, for example in 
highlighting the number of crimes conducted by migrants (Podrabinek 2013), is systematically 
bypassed by a paradigmatic populist logic of equivalence pointed out by Ernesto Laclau (2005: 
120): ‘an equivalential chain (between various demands of citizens, authorʼs note) can weaken the 
particularism of their links but cannot do away with it altogether’. In other words, Navalʼnyi does 
not ‘inventʼ corruption and migration as new political openings which would be tabooed by the 
political power; they are both recognised as a problem by the regime and official publicity (for 
more, see Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 185-191). Instead, he links these two into to the logic of 
equivalence. In this equivalence one problem is not highlighted at the cost of another, but the 
problem of migration is constructed as an acute with the problem of corruption, and eventually with 
the problem of the existing political rule (for more, see Lassila 2016; Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 185-
191). Thus, despite the sitting governor Sobianin was the actual initiator of using the antipathy 
towards migrants in his election campaign, the migration for Sobyanin is strikingly framed in line 
with cultural prejudices without linking it to economic issues. Here is one of Sobianinʼs views in 
the beginning of his campaign (Sobianin 2013): 
It is better to people, who do not speak Russian well, who have a completely different 
culture, to live in their own countries. For that reason we do not welcome their 
adaption in Moscow…after working here they must go to their families, to their home 
in their countries…I think Moscow is a Russian (rossiiskii) city and it must remain 
like that. Itʼs not Chinese, Tadzhik and not Uzbek.  
However, immeadiately after this anti-migrant view in line with outspoken ethno-cultural 
prejudices, Sobianin continued 
(w)e are always happy with our guests, Russia is a multinational country, and all 
nationalities are mixed. It is very dangerous, simply extremely dangerous, particularly 
for our city to pick them (particular ethnic groups, author’s note) up separately, to 
contrast ones with other cultures.    
Sobianinʼs sudden reference to official nationalities principles which underscore multicultural 
brotherhood somewhat contradicts his explicit claim of cultural incompatibility between ‘usʼ and 
migrants mentioned in the same breath. Regarding the excerptʼs ethno-nationalist beginning, the 
usage of the term rossiiskii (citizen of the Russian Federation) instead of russkii (ethnic Russian) – 
which would be more plausible in such context – is contrived as well.  Although the controversy in 
question does not allow us to judge that Sobianinʼs anti-immigration views are simply the 
opportunism of the sitting mayor in the face of Muscovitesʼ dramatically increased anti-immigrant 
sentiments, it anyway shows Sobianinʼs dependence on official views in relation to migration; 
outspoken xenophobia is followed by ritualistic mentions of multinational state. Likewise, 
Navalʼnyiʼs longstanding goal of demanding visas from citizens of the Central Asia, and repeatedly 
mentioned in his campaign (Navalʼnyi 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014d), is not touched upon. While 
various tightening measures has been recently introduced to migrants from the Central Asia – 
Sobianin referred to them in his campaign – visas has been out of the question. This geopolitical 
dimension in terms of sustaining direct links and influence upon Central Asia is the main 
explanation for the Kremlinʼs reluctance to establish the visa regime for these countries (Virkkunen 
& Fryer 2015).  
Going back to Navalʼnyi, the complexity between territorial borders and ethno-cultural features 
fuels his link between the fight with corruption and migration, although his constant demand for the 
visa regime concerns Central Asian states which do not belong to the Russian Federation. Here an 
important practice of corruption – and obvious facet of the Kremlinʼs geopolitical control over these 
states – is to grant Russian international passports to citizens of these states. According to 
Navalʼnyi, Russia granted 500 000 international passports to citizens of Kyrgyzstan in 2013 alone 
(Navalʼnyi 2013d). Since such measures seemingly torpedo attempts to require various kinds of 
permits to arrive and work in Russia – for instance, quotas for foreign labour (see below) – 
Navalʼnyi sees that the visa regime is the central means in cutting down corruption and the flow of 
migrants. It is noteworthy that in this case Navalʼnyi regularly forgets ‘illegalʼ as an attribute for 
this particular category of migrants which is hardly coincidence (Navalʼnyi 2013d). In other words, 
migrant is depicted as a facet to illegality, extended to illegal practices of the existing rule.  
In terms of Russiaʼs multiethnic composition, the ethnic dimension of migration does not follow the 
state borders of the Russian Federation. The same antipathy which is posed on migrants from the 
states of Central Asia is targeted at habitants of Russiaʼs Caucasian territories, particular those from 
Chechenia and Dagestan, the territories that ‘should not be fed anymoreʼ (Levada 2013). Whereas 
the demand of visa regime for these people is a far more complicated issue than for Central Asians, 
explicit ethno-nationalist markers (implying the separation between Russia and its Caucasian 
subjects) with suspicious international comparisons are touched upon (Navalʼnyi 2013d):   
Aleksei Venediktov: Senator McCain speaks that ‘we have 20-30 million illegal 
immigrantsʼ. He doesnʼt know either. The country with such a huge visa regime, and 
he doesnʼt know. Is this reason why you speak about this as well? Thirty people in an 
apartment. One arrives, starts a family, children are born. So, itʼs difficult to count on 
figures, right?  
Navalʼnyi: Well, first of all, these are different things. In spite of that, USA builds the 
wall against Mexico and even Obama votes for the wall with Mexico but here it is told 
that ‘please, come hereʼ. In addition, itʼs necessary to understand that the people (this 
is important as well) who arrive from Mexico, are Christians, people from a more 
developed country. Here arrive rural population from very backward Central Asian 
countries, principally Muslims.   
 
While cultural racism is eventually explicated, Navalʼnyi constantly converts it to ‘practicalities of 
Moscowʼs modern way of lifeʼ, implying his responsibility as a potential mayor and not forgetting 
his sarcastic compassion to Central Asians (Navalʼnyi 2013d): 
Today we are told ‘you know, the number of Muslims has so rapidly grown in 
Moscow. Letʼs build mosques for all of themʼ. However, they still arrive. We cannot 
build mosques for all, and Muscovites are against the great number of mosques. 
Regardless of acknowledging their problems, while symphatising them, we must say 
‘my friends, we cannot take here all the citizens from Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. 
We love and value them so much, but we introduce the visa regime and call them here 
in small numbersʼ.   
For Navalʼnyi backwardness associated with migrants fulfils the equivalence between migrants and 
corruption; corrupted regimes are backward and forced to resort to labour detrimental to Russiaʼs 
modernization. This aspect becomes apparent when migrants as a group is related to Russiaʼs 
closest ethnic neighbours, Belarus, and in particular, Ukraine. In an answer to Venediktovʼs 
question what is the difference between Ukraine and Tadzhikistan, Navalʼnyi answers as follows 
(the excerpt above is another part of his answer) (Navalʼnyi 2013d): 
First of all, as I mentioned, people who arrive from Tadzhikistan are youth coming 
from villages. 40 % of existing male Tadzhiks in the world, under 40 years old, they 
live here, in Russia. They are only capable for the least qualified jobs in addition to 
the completely collapsed system of education in Tadzhikistan. In general, there…from 
Ukraine can arrive programmers, from Ukraine can arrive a person…who can drive a 
tractor, complex vehicles, qualified worker in construction sites. From Uzbekistan 
such person cannot arrive – nobody teaches him there.          
These views behind the extraordinary electoral success of the oppositionʼs major candidate in 
surprisingly open circumstances in September 2013 were ended up to the dramatically different 
conjuncture that followed the Kremlinʼs annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. 
Not only situation for the opposition changed (Navalʼnyi was arrested in late 2013 and condemned 
to house arrest) but also the political space for national identifications changed; Slavic brother 
Ukraine had become the enemy number one as a state. However, it prompts to ask how this change 
was represented with regard to the phenomenon which momentarily superseded the nature of 
migration in Russia in the summer 2014: refugees from Ukraine.  
 
Refugees and Ukraine 
In order to illustrate the role of Ukrainian refugees in Russiaʼs media in the summer 2014, I 
conducted query with the help of Integrum databases statistics, by using search words ‘Refugee 
Ukraineʼ6 and ‘Migrantʼ7 . According to 2730 sources8 in the period 1 April 2014 – 1 April 2015 we 
receive the following figure:   
FIGURE 1: The frequency of mentions ‘Refugee Ukraineʼ and ‘Migrantʼ between 1 April 2014 – 1 
April 2015 in the selected set of data.  
 
 
The line whose peak is between 31 May – 31 October 2014 is the query ‘Refugee Ukraineʼ. The 
figure shows the unanimous visibility of the Ukrainian refugees in the Russian media during the 
summer 2014, clearly superseding the relatively stable role of migrants. Next I was interested how 
the issue of labour – regularly spelled out by Navalʼnyi with regard to migrants – was linked to the 
topic of Ukrainian refugees.  By using Integrumʼs popularity rating9 I searched the same set of 
sources (added by data consisting information of governmental organisations which was not 
                                                          
6 In Russian Беженец Украина which matches with all items consisting these words and their derivations together. 
7 In Russian Мигрант which matches with all items consisting the word and its derivations.  
8 I selected those sources which generally cover the media in the Russian Federation available in the Integrum: Central 
Press, Central news agencies, Regional newspapers, Regional news agencies, Central internet publications and the 
Internet media, and four databases consisting of television and radio monitoring   
9 This popularity rating is based on Integrum’s classification of the most relevant media on the basis of the selected 
databases (set of sources). In addition, the chosen items related to the given search words in the case of particular media 
(for example, the newspaper Kommersant) are ranked by Integrum based on the frequency of the search word(s) in the 
designated item as well as on outside links to the given item. For more, see Romanenko & Gerhenzon 2006. 
available for Integrumʼs statistics) with parameters ‘Ukraine labourʼ.10 Despite the dispersion that 
the query yielded, among the first four items of the queryʼs popularity rating three discussed on 
Ukrainian refugees in relation to labour (the items of the newspapers Kommersantʼ and Izvestia and 
the news agency IA Regnum). On July 11 2014 Izvestia published the article ‘Oblast increases the 
quota for foreigners due to refugeesʼ (Ivushkina 2014). In line with the newspaperʼs relatively clear 
pro-governmental stance, it is revealing that Ukrainians are not mentioned in the title. The issue is 
about necessity to increase the quotas in the Moscow oblast that the government has decided for the 
subjects of the Federation. Along with the Soviet-era echoes in which subjects and agents perform a 
kind of competition in fulfilling the stateʼs tasks, now various regions are planning to ‘ask the 
ministry of labour to increase quotas for their regions.ʼ In the end of the article, after repeating 
various bureaucratic procedures that changes for these quotas require, an excerpt of the head of the 
Moscow oblast employment committee Mikhail Korotaev finally touched upon the ethnic 
underpinning of the existing restrictions for the foreign labour (Ivushkina 2014): 
There are 75 thousand vacancies in the oblast, of which 4, 8 thousand include 
accommodation. Refugees are completely eligible to apply these vacancies. I point out 
that employers prefer Ukrainians to migrants from Central Asia because the first speak 
Russian and among them are more qualified specialists.  
 
On September 9 2014 Kommersantʼ, whose stance towards the government is more or less 
ambiguous, published the article, titled as ‘Ukrainian refugees were placed into the reserve of 
labourʼ (Kozlov 2014). It reports recent decisions made by the government concerning the 
substantial simplification of the procedure in employing Ukrainian citizens escaping the war, and 
informed by the Prime Minister Medvedev: 
…we must provide an opportunity to these people, not only stay in the territory of our 
country, but also make immediate decisions about the employment…Moreover, there 
are many qualified persons among them; engineers, doctors, teachers.  
Both of these articles pinpoint how the sudden reality of refugees is signified; while being 
exclusively linked to Ukraine, they are tangibly contrasted with migrants. And, whereas migrant is 
linked to labour, it is refugee which allows to specify the nature of foreign labour in highly 
idealized terms. Perhaps the most striking item of the query was the item by the information agency 
Regions.ru, published on June 26 2014 and titled as ‘Refugees from Ukraine are the excellent 
means in fulfilling our lack of labourʼ (Kuzin 2014). The author is a representative of the Russian 
                                                          
10 The actual query was marked as Украина рабочая сила /p3 which means that the words Украина (Ukraine) and 
рабочая сила (labour) appear in the frames of a group of 3 adjacent sentences. 
Orthodox Church, a protoiereus Alexander Kuzin, who did not hesitate to evoke cultural aspects, 
preferring them to possible interests of employers: 
Ukrainians…are people of our belief and culture. For us this is much more preferable 
(solution in comparison to Tadzhiks)…I do not have anything against them (Tadzhiks, 
Uzbeks) but Iʼm just worried that we ignore the interests of our culture and of spiritual 
processes in the society. Of course, for our employers this is not profitable since the 
status of refugee requires that citizen rights must be followed…citizens from 
Tadzhikistan do not attempt to receive these rights. Well, is it profitable for Russia 
what is profitable for employers? Of course not. It leads to a serious social tension 
which has appeared repeatedly caused by the incompatibility of the people who arrive 
us from Central Asia: they donʼt want to live according to our traditions.         
  
Despite Kuzinʼs views are expressed from different standpoints (a representative of the Church) and 
under different political circumstances than of Navalny, both of them address similar views 
concerning the nature of migration in Russia in the 2010ʼs; perverted, or corrupted, interests of 
employers in sustaining the flow of migrants from Central Asia whose people are culturally 
backward (and incompatible) with Russian traditions (or ideal practices of society). It is worth 
noting that the Russian mainstream discussion on Ukrainian labour shows a complete lack of 
reflection in terms of internal divisions within Ukraine, which has been the core dimension of the 
conflict between the countries. This lack fits with the picture boosted by the official Russian 
propaganda since early 2014: Ukrainians are those who are with us, while those who rage the war 
against us are more or less marginalized fascists, although in other occasions, the contemporary 
Ukraine is fulfilled by massively prepared perpetrators, helped by the West in slaughtering Russians 
(Ukrainians in Donbass). However, this imperial blindness is not only linked to the fabricated 
mentalities under the war propaganda but can be seen in Navalʼnyiʼs views as well, although from 
reverse, pro-Western standpoints. Navalʼnyi has repeatedly pointed out the similarity between 
Russia and Ukraine, which implies an equal blindness to those Ukrainian nationalist views which 
underline the full separation from Russia as a nation-state. For instance, in the interview in the Ekho 
Moskvy in October 2014, Navalʼnyi repeated the similarity between the countries and envisioned 
the necessity of the union between Russia and Ukraine (Naval’nyi 2014). As a mirror image to 
Putinʼs visions in which Russiaʼs Eurasian course is the guideline for Ukraine, for Navalʼnyi 
Ukraineʼs pro-Western course should be the orientation for Russia. In the realm of migration, both 
of these political opposites are entangled with the idea of seeing Russia as a powerful modern state 
with strong ethnic preferences.  
 
Conclusions 
While the overall negativity of the word ‘migrant’ among many ethnic Russians is not a surprise 
regarding the rapid growth of xenophobic sentiments, the positive framing of Ukrainian refugees in 
the mainstream media should be related to the extreme anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Russia’s 
official media since early 2014. On the one hand, the sharp contrast which emerges from the 
comparison between the Ukrainian state and Ukrainians fits with the Kremlinʼs assimilative 
capacity in instrumentalizing nationalisms – ethnic and imperial – for its political legitimacy. On 
the other hand, the link between the excutive political power and the mainstream media, regardless 
of their close relations in Russia, should not be seen in too straightforward manner. As Stephen 
Hutchings and Vera Tolz (2015: 252) point out, we should not oversimplfly the relationship 
between the Kremlin and the state-aligned media in terms of priviledging transitive meaning, 
conveyed from the state to the media, over transactional meaning which arises from multi-
directional interactions involving state, media, popular and other discourses. In comparing 
Navalʼnyiʼs campaign rhetoric on migration and the mainstream media views on Ukrainian 
refugees, we see that both views – let us generalise them here as oppositional and pro-governmental 
– adapt into common persisiting discourses concerning migration, labour and modernization, 
instead of a situation in which oppositional anti-migration rhetoric would be replaced by the 
absence of Central Asian migrants for the sake of Slavic refugees. Yet, it is obvious that the state-
controlled public discussion has partially managed to surpass domestic political concerns (migration 
as one of the most acute one) by harsh anti-Western and anti-Kiev propaganda, as the Integrum 
statistics above and the cited opinion polls indicate. Whereas the number of Ukrainian refugees in 
the summer 2014 was the fact which cannot be neglected whatever practices the stateʼs media 
follow (centralized partisan or more democratic), it is a political choice to frame these refugees with 
regard to migrants along with existing ethnic and cultural perceptions. From the Kremlin’s 
viewpoint, a transitive meaning would mean a straightforward idea to surpass popular prejudicies 
towards migrants without mentioning them, or even highlighting their importance in terms of 
Russia’s Eurasian orientation, rather than mirroring them to Ukrainians in negative terms. In other 
words, public discussion on Ukrainian refugees draws transactional meaning along with existing 
popular discourses.   
This allows to suggest that the discussion on migration in Russia in relation to the major political 
junctures divided by the annexation of Crimea has not changed the basic current of this discussion. 
As echoed by Navalʼnyi, Ukraine has figured as a wishful counterpoint to migrants, predominantly 
associated as the culturally alien to Russians. As such, this overall reluctance to everyday realities 
of Russiaʼs multicultural composition and of recently emphasized Eurasian allies in the Central 
Asia pinpoints the major challenge for the regime in sustaining the idea of multiethnic empire, 
regardless of various manipulations of ethnic nationalism posed by the official media discourse 
(Hutchings & Tolz 2015). Regarding the success that Navalʼnyi gained in the mayoral election, it 
can be argued that Navalʼnyi ‘civilizedʼ and ‘normalizedʼ (see Moen-Larsen 2014) ethno-nationalist 
and racist underpinnings of the dominant migration discourse in depicting European and ‘naturalʼ 
conditions for Russias’s modernization. It is thus noteworthy that Russiaʼs extreme anti-Western 
propaganda related to the Ukrainian conflict – launched by ‘Western backed fascist junta in Kievʼ – 
is generally absent in the public discourse on Ukrainian refugees. Instead, this post-Crimean refugee 
discourse easily conforms to the discourse advocated by Navalʼnyi before the crisis in which 
migrants and Ukrainians are contrasted in terms of qualified and backward labour, and justified by 
cultural factors. It is also noteworthy how particular expressions such as ’illegal migrant’ and 
’migrant’, or ’refugee’ and ’Ukrainian’, are used interchangeably. The migration discourse, in both 
political junctures, shows the vagueness regarding the major division of Russiaʼs nationalisms, 
imperial and ethnic (Laruelle 2009; 2014). For Navalʼnyi obvious emphasis lies on the ethnic 
nationalism but his views on Ukraine illustrate that particular imperial twist is present as well 
(Lassila 2016). Whereas the annexation of Crimea brilliantly shows how the explicit imperial 
operation was transformed into ‘defense of ethnic Russiansʼ, the dominant refugee discourse shows 
– not least due to the conflation between Ukrainian and refugee – how ethnic and imperial 
nationalisms are intertwined with seemingly sincere willingness to help people in distress. On the 
one hand, this help is motivated by the ethnic and cultural closeness, and, on the other, the discourse 
is overly blind to Ukraineʼs internal political divisions and its nation-state dimensions.   
In terms of discursive continuum from 2013 to 2014, Navalʼnyiʼs framework of the overall need of 
Russia’s modernization, projected into the usage and productivity of labour, is concretised by the 
opportunity to replace unpleasant representatives of backwardness and crime with culturally close 
relatives with qualified skills in labour. In other words, economic frame allows to civilize racist 
currents of the discussion. At the same time, this dominating frame does not resonate with the issue 
of supply and demand, the most obvious driving force in any usage of foreign labour. Besides all 
obvious and possible deviations and inhumanity – spelled out by Navalʼnyi – Russiaʼs migration 
dynamics follows the global dynamics between ‘the rich north and poor southʼ: poorly paid jobs in 
labour markets of richer countries are done by workers of poorer countries. This is exactly the 
situation between Russia and Central Asia. Russian discussion somewhat suggests that the 
structural problem of the low productivity of work is exclusively linked to migrants, not to poor 
Russian institutions of labour, and the solution would be the elimination of the backward labour by 
qualified workers. This notion supports Dubin’s view on ethnification of Russia’s general poor state 
of affairs as the main explantion of ethno-nationalist sentiments.  
Along with growing number of refugees from Ukraine and the worsening eonomic situation the 
vision of ethnically framed qualified workers as a remedy for the migration problem has gradually 
merged into a more straightforward xenophobia. For instance, in Kaliningrad the local unemployed 
were preferred to foreigners, and for those vacancies which were still available, Ukrainians were 
preferred to Central Asians. In other words, ethnic hierarchies are persistent but the nature of labour 
has not changed; Ukrainians can do those less paid jobs formerly done by Central Asians (Rosbalt 
2014). In September 2014, the newspaper Nezavisimaia gazeta pointed out that while the number of 
refugees from Ukraine had reached one million, Russiansʼ attitudes to them has become more 
critical (Garmonenko 2014). By citing the poll made by the Russian Foundation of Public Opinion 
(FOM) in September 2014, almost half of Russians wished to send refugees back to Ukraine as 
soon as possible while the moods were much warmer in couple of months earlier (ibid.).  
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